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Abstract 
The purpose of the research is to assess the land governance system in preventing state land conflicts in Zambia. 
In order to obtain insights about the actual realities on the ground, based on a case study strategy (i.e. Lusaka 
District has a study area), the research examined the present status of state land governance system, and 
investigated the efficiency of the present state land governance system in preventing state land conflicts. 
Methodologically, qualitative approach supported by quantitative approach was used to conclude that the present 
state land governance in Zambia is dysfunctional. This land governance system is characterised by lack of land 
policy, defective legal framework, defective institutional framework, defective technical issues and defective 
operational issues. Thus, the present land governance framework is unable to prevent state land conflicts. As a 
result state land conflicts are occurring with greater frequency in the country in general and Lusaka District in 
particular. In light of the foregoing, it is recommended that, the Zambian government should consider investing 
in land conflict prevention measures like formulating an appropriate land policy and land laws, establish 
effective land institutions, and undertaking effective technical issues (i.e. comprehensive land use planning, 
systematic cadastral surveying, systematic land registration, and transparent land allocation), improving the 
government-stakeholders nexus, and improving capacity building and awareness. 
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1. Introduction 
Africa in general and Sub-Saharan Africa [SSA] in particular is the scene of many conflicts related to land 
(UNECA, 2011). It has been shown that land conflicts can erupt into large-scale civil strife and violence 
(Yamano and Deininger, 2005). For instance, most of the conflicts in Africa (Darfur in Sudan, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Ethiopia versus Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Angola, Liberia, and Sierra Leone) 
over the last two decades have all been attributed to unresolved land issues (Anseeuw and Alden 2010; UNECA, 
2011). Conflicts over land in these countries impede development (Arko-Adjei, 2011; Mwesigye, 2014). Many 
African countries experiencing land conflicts have a fundamental problem of weak land governance 
(Byamugisha, 2013). In most African countries weak land governance is characterised by among other things; 
insufficient or inconsistent legal provisions, many different legal frameworks governing land and competing 
with one another, low levels of implementation, over-bureaucratised centralised institutions, lack of clear 
hierarchy or other form of co-ordination amongst the different land institutions, lack of human 
resources/technical expertise and finance, corruption due to poor remuneration of civil servants and lack of rule 
of law, high cost for land services only accessible to the rich in society, insufficient information to the public, 
lack of transparency, and lack of responsibility and accountability (Wehrmann, 2008; Zimmermann, 2006). In 
the face of this problem, in the past two decades, some African countries have undertaken land sector 
restructuring with the view of improving land governance. Despite this restructuring, literature review reveals 
that limited results have been achieved (see Anseeuw and Alden; 2010; AU et al., 2010; UNECA, 2011; Van Der 
Zwan, 2010). This implies that there are still substantial gaps in the governance of the land sector in most 
African countries.  
The foregoing contributions point to the level of vigorous research work on the African platform 
regarding land conflicts and land governance. Inspite of the numerous research works on the subject (land 
conflicts and land governance), little (if any) has been done in Zambia particularly on state land conflicts and 
land governance. It is from this background that this paper assesses the land governance system in preventing 
state land conflicts in Zambia. In so doing, we attempt to answer key questions including: 1) What is the present 
status of state land governance system in Zambia? 2) How efficient is present state land governance system in 
preventing state land conflicts in Zambia? This paper draws on international literature, personal experience and 
research in Lusaka District of Zambia to find answers to these questions. 
 
2. State Land Conflicts and Land Governance – A Literature Review 
2.1 Understanding State Land Conflicts 
State land is land held under statutory tenure. This tenure system is established by law or statutes (Payne and 
Durand-Lasserve, 2012; Musyoka and Musoga, 2015) and enables formal registration of land ownership. 
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Statutory tenure is largely an imported concept in African countries and is generally concentrated in urban areas, 
where it was designed to serve the interests of colonial settlers (Payne and Durand-Lasserve, 2012). A land 
conflict on the other hand is defined as a “social fact in which at least two parties are involved, the roots of 
which are different interests over the property rights to land; the right to use the land, to manage the land, to 
generate income from the land, to exclude others from the land, to transfer it and the right to compensation for 
it” (Wehrmann, 2008: 9). A state land conflict therefore, can be understood as a misuse, restriction or conflict 
over state land rights (adapted from Wehrmann, 2008). Put another way, a state land conflict is a disagreement 
over the use, access, possession, control and ownership of land between two or more parties (SCC and ZLA, 
2012).  
 
2.2 Land Governance – what it is 
The expressions “land governance” or “governance of the land sector” and, consequently, “good land 
governance” have been raised by the international community of land-experts as concepts emerging from a series 
of principles, conditions or success factors necessary for the establishment of sound land sectors (Espinoza, 
2012). A number of institutions - governmental and non-governmental - even argue that good land governance is 
a crucial pre-requisite for sustainable development and that the old fashioned concept of government in the 
context of land issues should no longer be the focal point of international discussions, but rather the processes 
behind and how these perform and contribute to the achievement of broader objectives (ibid). Literature review 
shows that the term land governance came into existence in the 1980s. In spite of the term being in existence for 
more than three decades, there is no agreed-upon definition for it. This paper therefore refers to land governance 
as “the rules and structures through which decisions regarding access to land and securing rights to that land are 
made and implemented” (adapted from Deininger et al., 2012; FAO, 2012). Rules for land governance include 
policies, laws, regulations, bye-laws and procedures (Palmer et al., 2009). On the other hand, structures for land 
governance include the executive, parliament, the judiciary, public land agencies, professional bodies to mention 
a few (ibid).  
Land governance covers all activities associated with the management of land that are required to 
fulfill political, economic and social objectives and achieve sustainable development (Enemark, 2009). 
According to Magel (2015), the whole is more than the sum of the parts. Thus, land governance should be 
understood as a system comprising the components which include land policy, legal framework, institutional 
framework, technical issues (i.e. land use planning, cadastre, land allocation and land registration) and 
operational issues (i.e. funding, human resource and equipment). These components should work as a whole and 
not as separated or independent components. Where the components are defective, the system of land 
governance is malfunctional and this has consequences which can be quite dramatic, for instance state land 
conflicts.    
 
3. Overview of Zambian Land Tenure System 
Zambia is a vast country with a total surface area of 75, 261, 400 hectares. It has two systems of land holding 
(see figure 1): (i) state land covering about 6% of the country and governed by a statutory tenure system; and (ii) 
customary land (formerly reserve and trust land) covering the remaining 94% and mainly held under customary 
tenure (Chileshe and Shamaoma, 2014). However, these figures have not been updated and therefore fail to 
account for any title conversions from customary tenure to statutory tenure (ibid), which have been undertaken 
since 1985. Due to the conversions of customary land to state land, Republic of Zambia (2015) estimates that 
currently the area for state land may be as high as 10 percent (7, 526, 140 hectares). This implies that customary 
land is estimated at 90 per cent (67, 735, 260 hectares) of the country’s land area. Moreover, the existence of two 
land tenure systems means that there are two types of land conflicts (i.e. state and customary land conflicts) and 
two types of land governance systems (i.e. state and customary land governance systems). On the one hand, state 
land conflicts occur on land under statutory tenure while customary land conflicts occur on land under customary 
tenure. On the other hand, state land governance system governs land under statutory tenure while customary 
land governance system governs land under customary tenure. The focus of this study is state land conflicts and 
state land governance system.  
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Figure 1: Map showing Land Categories in Zambia (Mulolwa, 2016) 
 
4. Methodology 
The research was primarily qualitative in nature but quantitative approach was also adopted to collect supporting 
data. The study adopted a case study strategy, where Lusaka District in Lusaka Province was studied. Lusaka 
Province comprises 8 districts namely: Lusaka, Chongwe, Luangwa, Kafue, Chilanga, Chirundu, Rufunsa and 
Shibuyunji. The provincial capital: Lusaka (selected as the study area of the research) is bordered by Kafue, 
Chilanga and Chongwe (see figure 2). Lusaka district of the Lusaka Province was selected because it is a hotspot 
for state land conflicts. 
Figure 2: Locational Map – Lusaka Province (Adapted from Chalochatu, 2017) 
Key Informants for this study were 38 employees of the selected public institutions (central and local 
government – 15 employees), land conflict resolution mechanisms (LCRMs – 6 employees), private firms (land 
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surveying and law firms – 6 employees), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs – 5 employees) as well as 
selected politicians from the ruling and opposition political parties (6 politicians). These key informants have 
experience in land conflicts and land governance. Questionnaires were used to collect information from these 
informants and purposeful sampling was used to select them. Further, interviews were conducted with 204 
households in Lusaka District and 6 academics (3 from the Copperbelt University and 3 from the University of 
Zambia) in order to determine the consistency of empirical data from the key stakeholders, thereby also 
enhancing data validation and reliability. Secondary data were also gathered through an analysis of various 
literature on land conflicts and land governance. Fieldwork was conducted between May and September, 2016.  
 
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1 Status of Land Policy and Legal Framework 
5.1.1 Status of Land Policy 
Research findings show that Zambia currently lacks a clearly codified and defined national land policy. Efforts 
to establish a codified land policy started in the 1990s but have been unsuccessful (Mbinji, 2012). This implies 
that Zambia has been trying, albeit without success, to put in place a land policy for over two decades (Mbinji, 
2006; ZLA, 2008). In a way, the absence of land policy has led to inefficient and ineffective state land 
governance system (adapted from Mbaya, 2000; Mbinji, 2012; ZLA, 2008).   
5.1.2 Weak Enforcement of the Lands and Deeds Registry Act of 1994 
According to Part III Section 35 of the Lands and Deeds Registry Act of 1994 chapter 185 “after land has 
become the subject of a Certificate of Title, no title thereto, or to any right, privilege, or easement in, upon or 
over the same, shall be acquired by possession or user adversely to or in derogation of the title of the Registered 
Proprietor”. This implies that the law provides protection to the person who is given a certificate of title. 
However, research findings show that people with land on title are not entirely protected. This is also confirmed 
by Bertelsmann Foundation (2014 cited in Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2016) that although land rights in 
Zambia are well-defined by law, they are poorly protected and not properly enforced. Particularly, ruling 
political party cadres have been grabbing titled land from unsuspecting land owners and demarcating plots for 
sale. In this regard, Lusaka residents called for sanity in the way state land is governed in the country especially 
in Lusaka District, sighting numerous media reports of political party cadres grabbing state land from citizens 
(ZLA, 2012). This shows that the rule of law had broken down in the country. 
5.1.3 Major Weakness in the Lands Act of 1995 
The Lands Act does not provide for the procedure for state land allocation. The absence of the procedure for land 
allocation in the Act has led to local authorities applying different terms and conditions to be satisfied by the 
applicants of land (Sichone, 2010). Thus, local authorities can give land to any person it considers appropriate. 
Evidence gathered from the questionnaires, interviews and documents indicate that the current state land delivery 
in the country is not based on the principle of equity. All the key respondents and academics indicated that that 
the poor are not able to easily access state land. One of the key respondents from a law firm commented:  
“Although land is an undeniable right bequeathed to all citizens regardless of status and place in life, the 
current land distribution system is characterised by inequitable state land allocation that give too much power to 
the rich and disadvantage the poor” (Key Respondent # 1). 
In this regard, the Lands Act has been criticised by international organisations and non-governmental 
organisations (UN-Habitat, 2005; ZLA, 2005). In particular, the criticism is on the lack of focus in the Lands Act 
on the needs of the poor (van Asperen, 2014). As a result the poor invade any vacant land (public or private) in 
cities and towns.  
5.1.4 Outdated Land Survey Act 
The Land Survey Act was enacted in 1960. Land surveying practice in terms of methods, procedures and 
technology has changed tremendously since 1960 which renders this Act inadequate to regulate cadastral surveys 
(Chileshe and Shamaoma, 2014). Most surveys are now performed using digital equipment (ibid). Despite the 
wide use of digital equipment the records still have to be converted to hard copy format to satisfy the law (ibid). 
There is no doubt that the current Act limits the medium of archival, accessibility, management and delivery of 
cadastral services to clients (ibid).  
 
5.2 Status of Institutional Framework 
5.2.1 Centralisation of MLNREP 
Prior to the adoption of the National Decentralisation Policy in 2002, the Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources 
and Environmental Protection (MLNREP) - the main institution in state land governance - was highly 
centralised. The Ministry had offices only in Lusaka District (Lusaka Province) and Ndola District (Copperbelt 
Province). The aim of this policy is to transfer authority, functions and responsibilities as well as appropriate 
resources to district level in order to improve quality of service delivery (Republic of Zambia, 2002). Research 
findings show that despite the existence of the policy, the Departments of Lands and Surveying in the Ministry 
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have offices at provincial level but no offices at district level. Moreover, the Lands and Deeds Department is still 
highly centralised with offices only in Lusaka District (Lusaka Province) and Ndola District (Copperbelt 
Province).  
5.2.2 Lack of Coordination between Land Institutions 
Since the Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Environmental Protection (MLNREP) has no offices at 
district level, it has delegated some state land governance functions such as land identification, land use 
planning, interviewing land applicants, and land allocation to the local authorities. This is because local 
authorities have offices in all 106 districts in Zambia. By establishment, local authorities fall under the Ministry 
of Local Government and Housing and not the Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Environmental 
Protection. Considering the foregoing scenario, these institutions are expected to collaborate to ensure the 
collective goal of effective state land governance. However, all the key respondents from government land 
agencies admitted that coordination is lacking. The issue of lack of coordination between land institutions is also 
confirmed by various authors and organisations (see for example, MLNREP, 2014; Mulolwa, 2016; UN-Habitat, 
2012). It is evident from the preceding scenario that it is asking too much to expect the two land institutions to 
make expeditious decisions in a seamless fashion (Mulolwa, 2002).  
5.2.3 Perception of Stakeholders on Corruption 
The study intended to find out whether or not there is corruption in state land delivery system. Thus, household 
respondents were asked to rate corruption in state land delivery system. The findings in table 1 indicate that the 
majority of household respondents (156 respondents representing 76.5%) think that there is corruption in state 
land delivery system.  
Table 1: Perception of Stakeholders on Corruption  
Perception of Stakeholders on Corruption Frequency (f) Percentage (%) 
Yes 156 76.5 
No 11 5.4 
No Response 17 8.3 
Do Not Know 20 9.8 
Total 204 100.0 
Source: Survey Data, 2016 
Particularly, Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Environmental Protection and local authorities 
(under the Ministry of Local Government and Housing) are corrupt (MLNREP, 2014; Musole, 2007). The issue 
of corruption was also confirmed by academics and key respondents from land surveying firms, law firms, and 
non-governmental organisations as well as politicians. One of the respondents from a land surveying firm 
asserted:  
 “There is no proper system of accountability in the delivery of title to applicants. For example while others can 
get title within one week others can take as many as ten years or more without explanation. While others can 
acquire multiple pieces of land using the system others cannot even afford one even with equal capability” (Key 
Respondent # 2). 
The whole state land delivery system is corrupt because just for one to have his/her land issue 
addressed they should part away with some money (Key Respondent # 3). The reason is that officials in public 
land institutions and politicians (i.e. councillors) have turned land as source of livelihood. Thus, corruption 
benefits those with money and the poor are ignored.  
5.2.4 Provision of Insufficient Information to the Public 
Land institutions were poorly rated regarding dissemination of information to the public on land allocation 
procedures, land laws, land rights and other land issues. According to table 2, out of 204 household respondents, 
164 respondents (80.4%) ranked the government as very inefficient and ineffective.  
Table 2: Dissemination of Information to the Public 
Land Institutions Dissemination of Information to the Public Frequency (f) Percentage (%) 
Very Efficient and Effective 0 0.0 
Somehow Efficient and Effective 15 7.4 
Very Ineffective and Inefficient 164 80.4 
No Response 9 4.4 
Do Not Know 16 7.8 
Total 204 100.0 
Source: Survey Data, 2016 
The issue of provision of insufficient information to the public is also confirmed in the Strategic Plan 
2014 – 2016 prepared by the Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Environmental Protection (MLNREP). 
According to MLNREP (2014), the public has little information on land laws, land rights and procedures for land 
allocation.  
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5.2.5 Poor Land Record Keeping 
There has been poor record keeping at land institutions - i.e. Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and 
Environmental Protection, Department of Physical Planning, and local authorities [city, municipal and district 
councils] (Sikazwe, 2005; UN-Habitat, 2012). Poor record keeping is still rife at local authorities (Lusaka City 
Council included) and Department of Physical Planning (Key Respondent # 4). The Ministry of Lands, Natural 
Resources and Environmental Protection (MLNREP) has made some efforts to ensure that the land records are 
stored in such a way that they are both sufficiently accessible and are safeguarded against any misplacement. 
Particularly, the Ministry established the Zambia Integrated Land Management Information System (ZILMIS) in 
2014. This computer system was procured and installed to trigger the migration from manual to the computerised 
land governance to improve efficiency in records management. The ZILMIS includes an integrated Geographical 
Information System (GIS) component to facilitate effective land governance. The ZILMIS was meant to replace 
the process used which was largely manual-in-nature with only several automated functions. This led to delay in 
the issuance of certificates of title and was not able to meet the challenges in land governance. Furthermore, the 
Ministry (MLNREP) had procured scanners for the purpose of scanning all hard copy files so as to digitalise 
them. In this regard, the Ministry’s target was to digitalise 80% of the physical records by 2016 (MLNREP, 
2014). However, as at 2016, the Ministry (MLNREP) has only digitised 40% of physical records (Key 
Respondent # 5). This implies that the Ministry still faces problems of poor record keeping and slow processing 
of certificates of title. It is evident from the foregoing that, although ZILMIS is a very good system, it is not 
being put to good use. In the light of the foregoing, the issue of missing files is very common. 
 
5.3 Status of Technical Issues 
5.3.1 Land Use Planning 
The study intended to find out whether or not land use planning was performing well. Research findings show 
that land use planning is done in an ad hoc manner. The overall effect is piecemeal, highly compartmentalised, 
haphazard, uncoordinated and disorderly land development (UN-Habitat, 2006, 2013). For instance, land is 
allocated on existing services such as roads, underground water and sewerage pipes. The foregoing predicament 
is due to the inadequate capacity by local authorities to monitor and control land development due to lack of 
equipment, inadequate personnel and financial resources, sheer complacency, and political interference (UN-
Habitat, 2007). Other reasons include lack of services or facilities map (i.e. you only notice when there is a 
problem or when constructing your structure), allocation of land in unplanned areas by both planners and 
political cadres, and allocation of land by political cadres in planned areas. 
5.3.2 Cadastral Surveying  
The principal purpose of cadastral surveys in Zambia is to give unambiguous spatial locations, sizes and shapes 
of land parcels specifically for land registration (adapted from Silayo, 2005). Despite its importance, state land is 
characterised by minimal cadastral coverage. To verify this, household respondents were asked whether or not 
they have cadastre for their land. According to table 3, the majority of respondents (133 respondents representing 
65.1%) did not have cadastre. 
Table 3: Do you have cadastre for your land? 
Variable Frequency (f) Percentage (%) 
Yes 41 20.1 
No 133 65.2 
No Response 30 14.7 
Total 204 100.0 
Source: Survey Data, 2016 
The issue of minimal cadastre coverage for state land was also confirmed by academics and all key 
respondents. One key respondent from a private surveying firm stated that “generally, cadastre coverage for the 
entire state land is less than 40%” (Key Respondent # 6).  
5.3.3 Land Allocation 
The study intended to establish whether or not the state land allocation is functioning well. Findings show that 
state land allocation is characterised by cumbersome procedure and lack of transparency. Firstly, according to 
table 4, the majority of household respondents (169 household respondents representing 81.9%) think that state 
land allocation procedure is cumbersome. 
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Table 4: Public Perception on State Land Allocation Procedure 
State Land Allocation Procedure Frequency (f) Percentage (%) 
Cumbersome 167 81.9 
Simple 6 2.9 
No Response 31 15.2 
Total 204 100.0 
Source: Survey Data, 2016 
The issue of cumbersome state land allocation procedure was also confirmed by academics and all key 
respondents. One of the key respondents commented: “the procedure for state land allocation involves far too 
many separate stages and decision-makers. This gives rise to delays in execution of the entire land allocation 
process” (Key Respondent # 7). The key respondents and academics were of the opinion that the process was 
lengthy. The process was lengthy as it had the potential of extending beyond several months, or even years 
(Musole, 2007).  
Secondly, the study intended to establish whether or not the land allocation processes are open to all 
members of society. In this regard, household respondents, academics, and key respondents from non-
governmental organisations, law firms, land surveying firms as well as politicians were asked to rate the 
transparency of government land institutions in land allocation. According to table 5, the majority (143 
respondents representing 70.1%) of household respondents believe that the government land institutions are not 
transparent when it comes to the allocation of state land.   
Table 5: Transparency in Land Allocation 
Variable Frequency (f) Percentage (%) 
Very Transparent 0 0.0 
Somewhat Transparent 20 9.8 
Not Transparent 143 70.1 
Do Not Know 29 14.2 
No Response 12 5.9 
Total 204 100.0 
Source: Survey Data, 2016 
Further, out of the 17 key respondents (from non-governmental organisations, law firms, land 
surveying firms as well as politicians), 12 respondents (representing 70.6%) think that land allocation is not 
transparent while 5 respondents (representing 29.4%) believe that land allocation is somewhat transparent. 
Similarly, out of the 6 academics, 5 lecturers (representing 83.3%) think that land allocation is not transparent 
while only 1 lecturer (representing 16.7%) believes that land allocation is somewhat transparent. Household 
respondents, academics, and key respondents who believe that land allocation is somewhat transparent stated 
that government land institutions (e.g. local authorities) do advertise when they have land to allocate. However, 
household respondents, academics, and key respondents who think that land allocation is not transparent pointed 
out that even if local authorities advertise land for allocation, the allocations are conducted way before the 
adverts and land is allocated to close associates. There is no transparency, in that there is already a list of names 
submitted to most local authorities (Lusaka City Council included) by politicians (from the ruling party) waiting 
for land (Response from Lusaka City Council Official, 2016). Thus, whenever there is land for allocation, the 
names on this list are given priority at the expense of the majority ordinary applicants (ibid). 
5.3.4 Land Registration 
Evidence gathered from documents, interviews and questionnaires indicate overwhelmingly that land registration 
in Zambia is not functioning well. Several numbers attest to this. Firstly, less than 50% of the ownership 
information in the register is up-to-date and reflects ground reality (Mulolwa, 2016: 64). Secondly, according to 
official records, there are only about 142,000 registered titles (ibid) in Zambia although the potential registrable 
land parcels are estimated to be over 900,000 (Key Respondent # 8). As a result over 80% of state land parcels 
are not registered in the land registration system (ibid). The majority state land users therefore lack tenure 
security. 
5.3.5 Land Occupation 
Land occupation is when a person exercises physical control over land. For instance, a person may put up 
buildings. Thus, the occupant of land is in occupation of it as long as he/she has the power of entering into and 
staying there at pleasure, and the power of excluding all other persons from the use of it. Findings show that in 
Lusaka District in particular and Zambia in general, many people have occupied or are occupying vacant private 
or public land illegally. One of the main reasons for this is that the state land delivery system is highly 
inequitable. Thus, many people especially those in low income group end up occupying any vacant private or 
public land without permission. The end result has been the majority of the urban population in Zambia residing 
in illegal urban settlements.  
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5.4 Status of Operational Issues 
Key respondents from Government land institutions indicated that there is inadequate or lack of funding from 
government. On the one hand, the issue of underfunding or lack of funding to the Ministry of Local Government 
and Housing (i.e. Department of Physical Planning and Local Authorities i.e. grants) has also been confirmed by 
various authors and the Government of Zambia (see, for example, Musole, 2007; Republic of Zambia, 2013). On 
the other hand, insufficient funding to the Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Environmental Protection 
(MLNREP) has also been confirmed by the Strategic Plan 2014 – 2016 prepared by the Ministry (MLNREP). 
According to MLNREP (2014), over time, the operations of the Ministry have been adversely affected by 
unpredictable and inadequate funding from the Ministry of Finance. 
Unpredictable and inadequate funding creates problems with the purchasing of equipment such as 
computer hardware and software, vehicles, global positioning systems, scanners, and typewriters. This has led to 
failure to adequately implement planned activities and compromised service delivery (MLNREP, 2014). 
However, this is not to say that “there is little or no investment in capital in the land sector” (Mulolwa, 2016: 
64). Zambia Integrated Land Management Information System (ZILMIS) provides an example of significant 
investment in the land sector (ibid). 
In addition, Research findings show that staffing levels do not meet the current demands of the land 
institutions to deliver services as required. Although key respondents from Lusaka City Council did not give 
numbers of staffing levels, they confirmed that the current employees are inadequate. A key respondent from the 
Department of Physical Planning (Ministry of Local Government and Housing) indicated that the full 
establishment requires 160 employees but 83 employees are available leaving a deficit of 77. Findings from the 
Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Environmental Protection show that there is insufficient staff at the 
departments of Lands, Survey, and Lands and Deeds. Even though a key respondent from the Lands and Deeds 
Department did not give numbers of staffing levels, he confirmed that the current employees are inadequate. Key 
respondents from the Lands and Survey Departments provided figures of staffing levels as follows: (i) The full 
Lands Department establishment requires 106 land officers but only 29 are available leaving a deficit of 77; and 
(ii) at the Survey Department only 1/4 of the required positions (i.e. Land Surveyors, Cartographers, 
Photogrammetrists, Examiners, Draftsmen etc.) are filled leaving a deficit of 3/4. For instance, the establishment 
requires 14 licensed land surveyors but only 4 are available leaving a deficit of 10. 
 
5.5 Efficiency of Present Land Governance System in Preventing State Lands Conflicts 
It will be recalled from the preceding section that the present state land governance framework in Zambia is 
malfunctional. Considering this, the big, ineluctable question must therefore be, if this present state land 
governance framework is able to prevent state land conflicts? According to all the key respondents and 
academics, the present land governance framework is unable to prevent state land conflicts such as invasion of 
idle or undeveloped private or public land, illegal allocation of land by some politicians and government 
officials, violent land acquisition by political cadres, boundary conflicts, multiple allocations of land, eviction by 
private landlord, and eviction by government agency. Therefore, these land conflicts are occurring with greater 
frequency in the country in general and in Lusaka District in particular.  
A score of A, B, and C were used to assess the frequency of state land conflicts occurring in Zambia in 
general and Lusaka District in particular. A means most frequent land conflicts, B means second most frequent 
land conflicts, C means the least frequent land conflicts. All the academics and key respondents provided the 
ranking shown in table 6. 
Table 6: Frequency of State Land Conflicts 
Types of Land Conflicts  Score  
Invasion of idle or undeveloped private or public land A 
Illegal allocation of land (e.g. by some politicians such as councillors, ruling political 
party officials etc. and government officials) 
A 
Violent land acquisition by political cadres B 
Boundary conflicts B 
Multiple allocations of land C 
Eviction by private landlord C 
Eviction by Government Agency C 
Source: Survey Data, 2016 
In addition, it should be pointed out that state land conflicts have implications such as loss of life and 
damage to property, high litigation costs, decrease food production, deny the government to raise revenue, and 
hinder investment.  
 
6. Conclusion and Recommendations 
The findings of this research show that the present land governance system is unable to prevent state land 
Research on Humanities and Social Sciences                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5766 (Paper)   ISSN 2225-0484 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.12, 2017 
 
9 
conflicts. The present system of land governance is unable to prevent state land conflicts due to lack of land 
policy, dysfunctional legal and institutional frameworks as well as improper technical and insufficient 
operational issues. Therefore, state land conflicts are occurring with greater frequency in the country in general 
and in Lusaka District in particular. The high incidence of state land conflicts have implications such as loss of 
life and damage to property, high litigation costs, reduce food production, deny the government to raise revenue, 
and deter investment.   
In light of the absence of preventive measures in the current state land governance system, the research 
suggests that the government should invest in land conflict prevention measures like formulating an appropriate 
land policy and land laws, establish effective land institutions, and undertaking effective technical issues (i.e. 
comprehensive land use planning, systematic cadastral surveying, systematic land registration, and transparent 
land allocation). These can only be achieved if there is active involvement and participation of various 
stakeholders (i.e. government and other actors) as well as ongoing capacity building and awareness. It should be 
borne in mind that if the land governance system is not improved, the problem of state land conflicts will remain 
unresolved or became worse.  
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